Trump and India

SANJAYA BARU

WHAT precisely the second presidency of Donald Trump will mean for India depends on which of the two views of India within the American strategic community comes to dominate the thinking within his administration. Both perspectives have one thing in common, namely, the United States intention to counter China’s growing global influence. In other words, US antagonism towards China is the framework within which both schools of thought view India. However, the difference in the approach of these two rival schools lies in their understanding of India’s role.

The first school of thought understands Indian desire to retain an independent foreign policy and not enter into any explicit alliance relationship with any other power. However, knowing full well India’s concern about China’s growing power and rising profile within Asia and around India’s neighbourhood, this school of thought believes that helping India emerge as a stronger economy and a more capable power in Asia can only help the US in dealing with China.

In short, what’s good for India is seen by this school as good for the US. This perspective gives India some policy space and allows it to be seen globally as an independent player. As one American analyst put it, “India’s rise as a geo-economic power is in the interests of the United States.”

The second US perspective takes a more instrumental view of India. India’s rise, it believes, should be favoured only if India will play the role of an ally, a military ally, moving strategically closer to the US. Those who hold this view expected India to support the West in the Ukraine war. They were disappointed that India not only refused to fall in line and oppose Russia but that it has in fact deepened the economic relationship with Russia by buying oil. India continues to maintain a defence relationship with Russia, even as the US-India defence relationship grows, albeit more slowly than is widely imagined and commented upon.

The US approach to India has swung between these two poles. The Indian political leadership never misses an opportunity to remind American leadership that the rise of a democratic India is in the larger and long-term interests of the democratic West, as opposed to the autocratic East — China, Russia, Iran. However, this claim stands on weaker legs given the global perception that India’s own democratic credentials have become weaker over the past decade. Those in the US, and the West in general, who question the first school of thought want to know why the US should be supporting the rise of an India characterized by ‘majoritarianism’ and one pursuing more insular economic policies. Donald Trump has among his supporters those who ask this question.

Those who expect India to move closer to the US as a military ally not only expect India to buy more defence equipment from the US but also be prepared to work with US forces. India has made it clear to the US that it reserves judgement on what would constitute shared strategic concerns. India certainly shares the US perspective about the challenge, if not threat, posed by China’s rise as a military power in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it has so far not revealed what role it would be willing to play if China were to attack Taiwan and the US became kinetically engaged in that conflict.

There is then the entire issue of trade. Trump’s decision to reappoint Robert Lighthizer as the US Trade Representative is a signal not just to China but to the entire world. Lighthizer represents what trade economics guru Jagdish Bhagwati refers to as the ‘Reciprocitarians’. Their view was best expressed by President Ronald Reagan who famously said, “We are always willing to be trade partners, but never trade patsies.” Reagan said that in 1987 when the US launched an intense trade war against Japan. Lighthizer came into prominence in the late 1990s as an opponent of the Clinton administration’s decision to grant China ‘permanent normal trade relations’ (PNTR) status and eventual membership of the World Trade Organization.

The trade actions that Trump took in his first term against China also hurt India. It remains to be seen if the trade actions he now proposes to take, like increasing tariffs, would be China-specific or end up hurting India as well. In his campaign speeches Trump has said nice things about India, Hindus and Modi, but has also identified India as a potential target for action on trade and tariffs.

All those in India celebrating Trump’s victory, merely because he was warm in his references to India and Hindus, and has now appointed Tulsi Gabbard to an important office, should wait and watch what he and his administration do. Will they accept the view that the rise of an independent, self-willed, strategically autonomous India, with its own cultural personality, is in the interests of the United States, merely because of the shared concern about China? Or, will Trump expect India to fall in line, as he expects the Europeans to do?

Then there’s immigration policy. Trump will get tough. Last year the US government reported that close to 100,000 Indians illegally entered the US. Trump will stop this but is likely to keep US doors open to the highly skilled Indians who have played and will continue to play an important role in giving currency to Trump’s campaign slogan — MAGA (Make America Great Again).

Indian Americans and Non-Resident Indians in the US have played a significant role in bolstering the American knowledge and services economy. Trump will have no problem with more ‘brain drain’ out of India.

Sanjaya Baru is a writer and Distinguished Fellow at the United Service Institution of India